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Some Aspects of Trade Secrets and
Their Protection: The Public
Domain and the "Unified
Description" Requirement
By R. M.

CUMMINGS*

Editors Note: Mr. Cummings' article outlines the theory behind trade
secret protectionwith emphasis on the policy considerationsof affording them this protection. He outlines the present state of the law and
concludes with guidelines as to the future applicationof the protection.
INTRODUCTION

In contemporary times, large companies that participate commercially in the sciences are keenly aware of the value of research and the necessity of maintaining a thorough familiarity
with recent scientific developments. Most major companies collect scientific journals and keep fairly up-to-date libraries of
periodicals, or have access to such documents through any of
several research institutes whose services are available, some on a
profit, and others on a non-profit, basis (e.g., the Battelle Institute
in Ohio) to anyone who may seek them. Companies themselves
publish trade journals displaying devices or describing processes
for trade or general good-will purposes. Consequently, methods
of constructing a device or operating a process are sometimes included in a document, either in a journal, an expired patent, or
a valid patent of some other device or process, so fully as to
enable anyone reasonably skilled in the particular field to make
the device, or operate the process without implementing any
imaginative force. In such a case, there would appear to be no
* Member of the New York Bar; LL.B., Columbia; Formerly associated with
the firm of Breed, Abbott and Morgan, New York; Presently of the General
Counsel's Office, Near East South Asia Region, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.
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reason why, if such publication is readily available, that its contents could not or should not be freely copied or disclosed without interference.
Where, however, a device or process not protected by a patent
is attempted to be kept as a trade secret, and the device or process
consists of many parts or stages, all of which are not contained and
disclosed in a single publication, certain difficulties are presented.
Firstly, if most of the parts or stages are disclosed in one publication, except for an element or elements that would be obvious to
one skilled in the field, should the secret be protected? Secondly,
if most or all of the essential elements are disclosed separately in
several or many publications available to those in the trade, should
the secret be protected? Should the result be different where
analogous devices or processes are known fully as well? Does the
difficulty in assembling the literature constitute the secret itself?
Thirdly, and finally, what might be the effect of a contract between the party desiring to use or disclose the device or process
and the party seeking to protect the alleged trade secret, particularly whre the contract contains specific provisions governing
use and disclosure of the device or process?
BACKGROUND

A "trade secret" is, generally, some formula, pattern or device
or compilation of information used in one's business. It need
not reach the status of invention, and all that is required is that
the information or knowledge represent in "some considerable"
degree, the independent efforts of its claimant.1 While a "trade
secret" generally relates to the production of goods (i.e., a machine
or formula for the production of an article), it may be a list of
customers, or any collection of knowledge that gives one an advantage over one's competitors.
The patent laws exist to promote and protect inventions.
"Trade secrets," however, need not reach the heights of concepts
that warrant a patent. In protecting them, courts give recognition to the work and industry of an entrepreneur by creating a
protectable property right in the fruits of his labor in certain instances. As long as one has exercised sufficient initiative in colSee Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); B. F. Goodrich
v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio 1963); Restatement, Torts § 757(b) (1939).
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lecting information adequate to give rise to a competitive advantage, and the collected information is not readily available to
the public, it would seem to be justifiable to protect the efforts of
the diligent. Such protection gives rise to added incentive and injects a much needed "commercial morality" into the affairs of
industry. Where, however, the information in question is readily
available to the public, the justification for protection lacks the
same intensity.
It is a well established principle that matters in the public
domain are available for anyone's use.2 As stated in American
Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp.:
The discoverer who attempts to keep secret his machine or
process of manufacture has no exclusive right to it as against
the public who uncovers the secret by fair means, or against
those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it without the
breach of a contract or of a confidential relationship with
the discoverer.3
The problem, semantically, is, however, to define the "public
domain" for purposes of applying the rule.4 The Restatement of
Torts section 757, comment b (1939), has made this contribution:
Secrecy: The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret.
Matters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in an
industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret....
Nevertheless, a substantial element of secrecy must exist,
so that, except by the use of improper means, there would
be difficulty in acquiring the information.
Thus, where the item in question has been disclosed by the
holder of the secret on the open market where it has been offered
for sale, there is generally held to be no protctable trade-secret, 5
2

See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Speciner
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 177 F. Supp. 291 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
3 125 F.2d 446, 452 (6th Cir. 1942). See also, Darsyn Laboratories v. Lenox
Laboratories, 120 F. Supp. 42, aff'd., 217 F.2d 648, cert. denied, 849 U.S. 921
(1954).
4See generally, Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Dulon, 196 F. Supp. 437 (E.D.
N.Y. 1961), discussing the definition of trade secrets in Restatement, Torts § 757
(1939).
5 See, e.g., Speedry Chem. Prods., Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328
(2nd Cir. 1962) fdisclosure on market and in publications); Northrup v. Reish,
200 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1953); Speciner v. Reynolds Metals Co., 177 F. Supp.

291 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); Carver v. Harr, 132 N.J. Eq. 207, 27 A.2d 895 (1942);
of. Ricordi v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952).
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since the "right to protection begins and ends with the life of
secrecy."
The right of the public to make use of things in its domain
is necessarily contrasted with the rights of the holder of the
secret. Attempted harmonious syntheses of these rights lead to
statements such as made by the New York Court of Appeals in
Tabor v. Hoffman, where it was stated:
Independent of copyright or letters patent, an inventor or
author has, by the common law, an exclusive property in his
invention or composition, until by publication it becomes the
property of the general public.7
Where there is a confidential relationship between the parties
by virture of an agreement between them (i.e., employer-employee
relationship), a trade secret will be carefully protected. 8 Where,
however, there has been a public disclosure, notwithstanding a
contract, the secret will no longer be protected unless the contract
contains a provision to the contrary.9 Thus, if a publication discloses the secret in full, it is in the public domain and not protected,10 just as if the item had been disclosed by virtue of its
having been offered for sale on the open market by the holder
of the secret.
The rationale in such cases is clear. No protectable value can
be attributed to a device or process that is ascertainable, without
effort, by actually seeing the device or process in operation, or
by examining a publication revealing the device or process in its
entirety from which one skilled in the field could readily reconstruct such device or process. Where, however, any more
6Dollac Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41, aff'd., 275 F.2d 202 (3d

Cir. 1960).

7 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889). See also, Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v.
Dodds, 19 Weekly L.Bull. 84 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (1887) (Taft, J.). See
generally, Turner, The Law oY Trade Secrets (1962).
8 See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964).
9 See American Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d 446 (6th
Cir. 1942). Dollas Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41 (3d D. N. J. 1960);
Darsyn Labs. v. Lenox Labs., 120 F. Supp. 42 (D. N.J. 1954).
10See Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912 (7th

Cir.), cert denied, 347 U.S. 979 (1953); Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal
Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1949); of. JNOT, McCoy, Inc.

v. Schuster, 44 F. Supp. 499 (S.D. N.Y. 1942); Tampax, Inc. v. Personal Prods.
Corp., 38 F. Supp. 663 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd., 127 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

316 U.S. 665 (1941).
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effort is necessary, such as even that requiring the collection of
publications, the problem becomes somwhat different.
The problem is not dissimilar to that of "patent anticipation."
Under this doctrine, a patent cannot be obtained if from prior
literature, including previous patents, one skilled in the art could
reconstruct the device for which a patent is sought.
If this were not so, it would be burdensome and unreasonably
difficult for professionals in any field to make use of "prior art."
Also, an undue reward would be given to one whose contribution
consists of no more than a slight refinement of a device already
known and available to the public.
PUBLICATIONS WHERE ALL THE ELEMENTS
HAVE NOT BEEN DISCLOSED

As a general rule, if all "essential details" have been disclosed,
the process has become part of the public domain and cannot be
claimed by the claimant as his or its property. 1 The significant
words here are "essential deatils." Thus, if everything is disclosed
except certain aspects that would be obvious to one skilled in the
art, it should follow that there is no protectable trade secret.
There is no authoritative case directly on this point in the area
of trade secrets, but the problem has been dealt with in "patent
anticipation" situations.
In the area of patent anticipation, the rule is established that
to determine anticipation "the description in the prior printed
publication is to be read in the light of the knowledge possessed
12
by persons skilled in the art to which the invention relates."'
Thus, while essential elements cannot be read into the description,
the description need not give information known to those skilled
in the art.13

Prior patents to anticipate must disclose that which would
enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention without
". See Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., supra note 10.
121 Walker, Patents 278 (Deller's ed. 1964). See also, Vacuum Cleaner Co.
v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 258 F. 289 (D.C. Iowa 1919), appeal dismissed, 272 F.
1023 (8th Cir. 1919); In re Hooker, 36 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1164, 175 F.2d 558,
562 (1949), where the court stated that "a cited patent does not lose its validity
as a reference by failure to describe in detail that which is obvious to those skilled
in the art."
33Cohen v. United States Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366 (1876); Willamette-

Hyster Co. v. Pacific, 122 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1941).
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inventive skill or further experimentation. 14 The following appears in 1 Walker, Patents 296 (Deller's ed. 1964):
"Mere omission of element which may be supplied by skillful mechanic not fatal to anticipation."
A difference which consists of a mere omission of something
which a skillful mechanic would supply is not fatal to anticipation. The phrase "skillful mechanic," as used in this connection, does not include mechanics who are skillful only in
methods of servile imitation. It refers only to mechanics who
know how to vary form without varying substance and who,
in constructing a machine or manufacture from a printed
description or from Patent Office drawings, could readily,
and would freely, alter proportions and change details in
order to adapt the contrivances to a particular use, or in
order to secure greater merit of workmanship for the thing
constructed.
Thus, the omission of obvious details in a prior publication does
not avoid anticipation."; Furthermore, even if the device disclosed in the prior art was not designed for the exact purpose of
the one for which the patent is sought, there is still anticipation if
16
from the prior art one could construct the new device.
In the leading case of Busell Trimmer Co. v. Stevens, 7 where
the issue of insufficiency of prior publications was raised as to
descriptions of a type of rotary blade, the Court found that there
was no patentable difference between a rotary cutter of leather,
in which the teeth were solidly incorporated in one piece with
the hub, and a cutter, in which the teeth were detachable. The
Court stated:
14 Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186 (1893); Hoff v. Iron Clad Mfg.
Co., 139 U.S. 326 (1890). In the case of In re Blondiau, 87 C.C.P.A. (Patents)
1018, 181 F.2d 2223, 225 (1950), the court said, "a reference patent need not
describe in detail that which is obvious to one skilled in the art." See also,
In re Haney, 34 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 767, 158 F.2d 296, 298 (1946), where the
court stated that "the law is well settled that a reference patent need not describe
in detail that which is obvious to any person skilled in the art."
15 See, e.g., Ranco, Inc. v. Gwynn, 128 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1942); Chase
v. Fillebrown, 58 F. 374 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893); In re Barsky, 20 C.C.P.A. (Patents)
779, 62 F.2d 192 (1932). See also, Downton v. Yeager Milling Co., 108 U.S.

462 (1883).

16See, e.g., Allied Wheel Prods. v. Rude, 206 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1953);
Liesham v. General Motors Corp., 191 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1951); Ranco, Inc. v.
Gwynn, supra note 15; Chiplets, Inc. v. Inv. v. June Dairy Prods., 114 F. Supp.
129 (C.D. N.J. 1953).

17 137 U.S. 423 (1890).
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The evidence, taken as a whole, shows that all of those claimed
elements are to be found in various prior patents-some in
one patent, and some in another, but all performing like
functions in well-known inventions having the same object
as the Orcutt patent, and that there is no substantial difference between the Brown metal cutter and the Orcutt's cutter, except in the configuration of their molded surfaces. That
difference, in our minds, is not a patentable difference, even
though the one cutter was used in the metal art, and the other
in the leather art.'
Hence, if a publication reveals the equivalent material elements of a subsequent patent used for an analogous purpose, in
a similar combination, performing an identical function in substantially the same way, there is anticipation, even if the publication does not include elements that would be obvious to any
person skilled in the art. It should follow, by analogy, that if
one publication contains the material elements of a would-be
trade secret except for those things that would be obvious to one
skilled in the art, there is no secrecy. As stated in Sarkes Tarzian,
Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc.,19 quoting Ellis, Trade Secrets section
244 (1953):
[W] here the idea was well-known or readily ascertainablethe
courts will rule that there is no legally recognizable trade
secret. In other words, the discloser must treat the recipient
of the disclosure equitably. That means that he connot take
advantage of the recipients ignorance of facts well-known
or readily ascertainable. 20 (All italicized in original.)
While no trade secret case has been found stating that something was not a protectable trade secret because a publication
contained a majority of the elements while the others missing
were obvious to one skilled in the art, this should be a logical
conclusion from the analogy to the patent anticipation cases. That
this is the law is indicated in Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices,
Inc., 21 where the court refers to publications "which were distri-

buted to the industry describing the essentials details of what
18 id.at 433.
19 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 869 (1961).
20
Id.at 263.
21
Supra note 19.
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Tarzian claimed to be its exclusive process. ' 22 On the basis of
such publications, the court found the trade secret to be in the
public domain.
DISCLOSURE OF PARTS SEPARATELY IN SEVERAL
OR MANY PUBLICATIONS

In a recent decision, Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein,23 the
court found that a confidential relationship between a former
employee and employer had been breached by virtue of a misappropriation of a trade secret. The court found that the prior
art references did not disclose each separate part of the secret, and
added in a dictum:
However, even if each item were disclosed by prior art (and
the finding is to the contrary) and the plaintiff combined
them in a method or process which produced a superior
product, it would still have met the standard of a protectible
24
trade secret.
The significance of this statment must be understood in terms
of different situations. Where a party has not made a search of
the literature itself and has relied entirely on information given
to it by the holder of the secret, it is arguable that Judge Anderson's conclusions in the Sperry Rand case should govern. Where,
however, a party has been diligent in its search of the literature
and has maintained a familiarity with recent developments, and
this could enable one skilled in the art to construct the device or
implement the process, it would seem that this is good faith uncovering and acquisition of the secret by fair means that should
25
not be penalized.
Even if the party seeking to make use of the secret has not
searched the literature, it is arguable that if the secret was "readily
ascertainable" at the time it was disclosed by the holder, at least
he should not be able to get equitable relief to restrain the use
22 Id. at 283.

23 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964).
24 Id.
25

at 560.
See Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150

(2d Cir. 1949); American Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d

446 (6th Cir. 1942); Tom Lockerbie, Inc. v. Frihling, 207 F. Supp. 648 (E.D.
Minn. 1962).
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or disclosure of the secret, since no grave and irreparable damage
26
can be shown.
Several decisions have relied on a combination of references in
finding a trade secret to be in the public domain.2 7 The most
relevant and edifying, because of the facts, is Sarkes Tarzian, Inc.
v. Audio Devices, Inc 8 Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants
from using and disclosing information obtained from former
employees, constituting a trade secret, consisting of know-how and
information used in manufacturing and selling silicon rectifiers.
The defendant, in its answer, asserted the materials and methods,
as well as the products involved, were generally well-known in
the industry and were described in numerous publications and
documents including textbooks, periodicals, lectures, patents and
government reports, all widely circulated in the trade and available
to the public. The court denied relief, both injunctive and compensatory, on the grounds that there was no trade secret because
the alleged "secret" was a matter of public knowledge and also
because defendant's processes and devices were different from
plaintiff's by virtu of their own development and expenditure,
and differences in appearance (largely size). While the court,
at one point, refers to plaintiff's trade secrets, in considering injunctive relief, the court went on to say that "of course, even in
the absence of proof of damages injunction may still issue provided that Tarzian has a trade secret which was taken from them
29
and used, even though so-far profitlessly, by the defendant."
(Emphasis added.) The court, in other places, refers to the
possible existence of a single trade secret, and makes many statements of value in considering the problem of disclosure and
protection. The court stated:
2

6 See Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Dulon, 196 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. N.Y.
1961); National Starch Prods. v. Polymer Indus., 273 App. Div. 732, 79 N.Y.S.2d
357 (1948). See also, Restatement, Torts § 757 (1939); Turner, The Law of
Trade Secrets (1962).

27 See Tom Lockerbie, Inc. v. Fribling, 207 F. Sunp. 648 (E.D. Minn. 1962);
Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958);

Mycalex Corp. of America v. Pemco Com.. 64 F. Supp 420 (D. Md.), aff'd., 159

F.2d 907 (4th Cr. 1946); Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1,
138 N.E. 485 (1928). But see, Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 374 (7th
Cir. 1953); Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958);
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 671 (Sup.
Ct.), 28192 N.Y.S.2d 102, aff'd., 226 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1959).
Supra note 27.
29Id. at 269.
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What is a trade secret is difficult to define. However, on the
whole it must consist of a particular form of construction
of a device, a formula, method or process that is of a character which does not occur to persons in the trade with
knowledge of the state of the art or which cannot be evolved
by those skilled in the art from the theoretical description of
the process, or compilation or compendia of information or
knowledge.30
Nothing that the process involved consisted of eight basic
steps necessary to manufacture a silicon rectifier, the court found
the "secret" to be in the public domain by virtue of the fact
that all the separate parts were well-known in the trade. The
court observed that "an analysis of the literature and especially
of five exhibits indicates that these steps and the alternative choice
of materials to use were generally known in the art late in 1957
and earlier." 3'
Some of the publications referred to by the court were government publications "which were distributed to the industry describing the essential details of what Tarzian claimed to be its exclusive process.''32 (Emphasis added.) Hence it should follow
that such publications can put a "trade secret" in the public
domain.
The court indicated that if each separate component were
available commercially, and publications revealed all the essential steps, the "secret" was in the public domain. The court
stated:
The evidence is overwheling that the machines and equipment for pulling crystals, slicing crystals, dicing crystals and
performing all the other steps necessary to the production of
this device are advertised in catalagues by nationally known
firms who sell them either from stock or modify them to suit
the particular need of a manufacturer. They were not a
secret source of supply open only to Tarzian which he could
33
bind his employees not to disclose to others.
Taking all the prior art into consideration, the court concluded
that "the individual steps of plaintiff's process, or the process in
30 Id. at
31 Id. at
32 Id. at
33 Id. at

257-58.
271-72.
283.
285-86.
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toto, as described in plaintiff's statement filed herein July 15,
1958, are not trade secrets in law and in fact. ' 34 In determining
the dates of the references that the court may look at in determining if it will protect a trade secret, the court said that "as this
is an equity case, it must be decided on the state of the record as
it exists on the date of the decree, and the court may find the facts
as they exist then without supplemental pleading."3 5
The following findings of fact by the court are of interest:
36. The production know-how, information and data which plaintiff claimed to be restricted, confidential and secret in paragraph VIII of the complaint herein is set forth in detail
in 43 steps and combinations thereof described in plaintiffs
answers to interrogatories, filed herein July 11, 1957 and
marked Exhibit JN in these proceedings.
87. The trial of this case consumed 17 days. The transcript in the
case covers over 2,500 pages. Portions of depositions were
introduced which were not transcribed into the record. The
plaintiff introduced 214 exhibits, the defendant 274. Many
of the exhibits consist of pamphlets and documents of many
arriving
pages. All have been restudied since the trial 3in
6
at the conclusion that Tarzian had no trade secret.
This indicates that many publications will be considered in finding a trade secret in the public domain. The court also looked
to analogous processes and the published literature in these
areas to reach its decision, e.g., the court stated that "there is a
known equivalency between germanium and silicon and between
transistors and rectifiers made of such semiconductive materials
and the fused junction rectifier is similar to the fused junction
transistor in construction." 37 The court cites many exhibits in
reaching the conclusion that the process involved several basic
38
steps which were known generally to the trade.
The result would seem to be sound. Parties are, or should be,
aware of the practice of companies in collecting journals and
conducting independent research. The benefits of such activity
should be available to those who are diligent enough to operate
companies with such progessive and enlightened policies. Other84 Id. at 290.
85 Id. at 278.
36Id. at 286.
3 1bid.
88 Id. at 286-87.
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wise, improvements could not be made available to the public
and competition would unnecessarily be hampered.
THE EFFECT OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE HOLDER OF THE
TRADE SECRET AND THE PARTY WISHING TO USE OR DISCLOSE IT

The purpose of this article is not to rehash the problem of
post-employment restraints which has already been dealt with at
great length,39 and which has been the subject involved in two
recent decisions. 40 Briefly, these cases and the article cited indicate
that an injunction will be granted to restrain a former employee
from disclosing a trade secret learned while an employee, where
there is an express or implied term in his employment contract
not to disclose the trade secret. Apart from any provisions in a
contract, "general knowledge" in the trade is not protectable, but
an injunction may lie to prevent disclosure of "special knowledge"
or a particular skill that is peculiar to the employer concerned.
Even in a case where a protectable trade secret exists, a contract
may permit its unfettered use and disclosure. Thus, the court, in
American Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp.,41 observed:
The discoverer who attempts to keep secret his machine or
process of manufacture has no exclusive right to it as against
the public, who uncovers the secret by fair means, or against
those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it without the
breach of a contract, or of a confidential relationship with
the discoverer.4
It follows that the terms of the contract shall govern, and where
they permit use and disclosure of a trade secret even if it is still
secret, there is no breach of contract if the party uses or discloses
the secret. Where a contract is unclear as to a party's rights to use
and disclose a trade secret, there is still no right to injunctive relief since equity will not enforce a vague contract.43 The principle
44
is also well established in state courts.
39 See Blake, Employee Agreement Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625,
667 (1960).
40 See E. I. DuPont v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428 (Del.
1964); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio 1968).
41125 F.2d 446 (6th Cir. 1942).
42Id. at 452.
43

See Colson v. Thompson, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 836 (1817)

(No specific

performance unless contract is "certain, fair and just in all its parts."); Salisbury
v. Tibbetts, 259 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1958) (same); Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian,
(Continued on next page)
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Several possible contract situations should be examined further
to complete this analysis.
First, where there is a licensing contract between the holder
of a trade secret and a licensee, and subsequently, information
about the trade secret is revealed in trade journals, it would seem
that the license royalties must be contained to be paid for the
trade secret under the terms of the contract even if the process
45
becomes known to the public.

If this be so, suppose that the person having access to a trade
secret by contract, or a person acquiring the trade secret in a
confidential relationship (e.g., a proposed buyer of the business)
uses the trade secret in breach of the contract. After this breach
of contract or tort, the trade secret is revealed in trade journals
and placed in the public domain. What type of remedy does the
owner of the trade secret still retain?
One solution is that proposed by the Seventh Circuit in Shelmar Prods.Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co. 46 Under this decision, a prior

wrong of breach of confidence bars one from an advantage free to
the rest of the world and a permanent injunction will ensue.
Hence, the injured party would be entitled to money damages to
compensate for his loss up until the time of the action and a
permanent injunction.
A better, more recent, and apparently the majority approach
is that expounded by the court in Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co.4 7 The result under this decision is that

there will be no liability of the first unauthorized use if the disclosure occurs after the end of secrecy unless express or implied
terms in a contract agree to the contrary. There would be liability,
however, for improper use until disclosure.
(Footnotes continued from preceding page)

147 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1945) (same); Okeh Phonograph Corp. v. Armstrong,

:63 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1933) (No injunction to prevent breach if contract is
,vague.); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Houston Co., 251 F. 559 (1st Cir.
.1918) (same); 5A Corbin, Contracts § 1171 (1964); 5 Williston, Contracts § 1424
(rev. ed. 1937).
44 See Hunter v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 2d 100, 97 P.2d 492 (1939);
Hein v. Shell Oil Co., 315 Ill. App. 297, 42 N.E.2d 949 (1942); Potter v. Wolff,
138 N.J. Eq. 114, 47 A.2d 9 (1946); Linder Co. v. Myrod Shoe Co., 38 Ohio
App. 182, 175 N.E. 879 (1930).
45 See Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178
F. Supp. 655, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960).
46 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936).
47172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.).
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Finally, if the information is related tortiously, or in breach
of contract, into the trade journals, the result might well be different. It is established in the American Dirigold case48 that the
information disclosing the secret must be acquired in "good faith"
and by "fair means," "without the breach of a contract, or of a
confidential relationship with the discoverer." 49 It would follow
then, as Turner points out, that it does not matter how the
secrecy ends, except that'the disclosee cannot rely on his own
unlawful act that ended the secrecy to prove the defense that the
disclosure is no longer secret.50
CONCLUSION

When a party agrees not to disclose or use a trade secret, and
then finds that it has been revealed to the public and that anyone
skilled in the art could recreate the device or implement the
process, there is no reason why as in the case of an expired patent
that party should be prevented from using or disclosing the
secret, although royalties may still have to be paid for its use.
Where a contract permits disclosures of a trade secret once it
has entered the public domain, there is no relief for use or disclosure if from publications, one skilled in the field could reproduce the device or implement the process, provided the disclosee did not itself unlawfully publish the secret. It is not clear
whether or not something will be considered in the public domain
if extended effort is necessary to gather all the literature, piece it
together, and thus assemble the parts of the secret. The "readily
ascertainable" and "difficult to acquire" tests of Sarkes Tarzian,
Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc.,51 and the Restatement of Torts section
757 (1939), are difficult to apply, particularly when a trade secret
consists of many parts and a great deal of literature is involved that
discloses the parts separately. Perhaps the only workable rule is
to find everything in the public domain that can be recreated
from all the prior art references by one skilled in the field, if it
can be shown by use of expert witnesses that there was the literature. While this test also leaves much to be desired, it permits
48 125 F.2d 446 (6th Cir. 1942).
49
Id. at 452.
50
Tuner, The Law of Trade Secrets 438 (1962).
51 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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parties to make use of their own efforts and research without inflicting hardship on the holders of alleged trade secrets. On the
other hand, such cases as Tabor v. Hoffman5 2 indicate that there
must be an awareness of the publications at the time of disclosure,
and hindsight that analysis of trade journals might well have revealed the same information is not sufficient. This is not unreasonable because in such a case the thing unlawfully diclosed
is still secret as far as the disclosee is concerned at the time of the
disclosure. Perhaps the holder of the secret should not be able to
take advantage of obvious publications not known to the disclosee,
but short of this, a reasonable familiarity with trade literature
should be required before a disclosee can free itself of non-disclosure obligations by virtue of the trade secret's entering the
public domain.
If all the essential elements of a trade secret are revealed by
the literature, and the disclosee is familiar with the literature,
and the elements missing would be obvious to one skilled in the
art (permitting that such person can rely on knowledge acquired
through his education and on general knowledge known throughout the field), then the trade secret should also be considered to
be in the public domain.
If the outcome of this discussion seems to favor disclosure and
use of trade secrets, it is because the benefit to society generally
outweighs the maintenance of secrecy. While property rights in
trade secrets will still be recognized, the coverted process or device
must, in fact, be secret.
If further protection is desired, a patent should be sought.
Where a patent has expired, an extension of the patent monopoly
should not be permitted through the use of "trade secret" protection,53 and where state law forbids the use and copying of unpatented articles, this may be a violation of the patent law. 54 As the
United States Supreme Court has recently said, "an unpatentable
article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the
public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to
52118

N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889).

53See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Ar-Tik Sys., Inc. v. Dairy
Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1962) (Royalties for patent license after
expiration of patent not permitted.); cf. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United

States, 841 U.S. 593 (1950).
54See

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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do so." 55 While a state can protect holders of property rights and
protect purchasers from confusion, "because of the federal patent
laws a state may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages
for such copying."5 6 It is generally accepted that the protection
of "trade secrets" is generally governed by state law.57 However,

Sears, Roebuck 1k Co. v. Stiffel Co.5 raises the possibility that
when a trade secret falls into the public domain, a state law that
forbids its free use may violate the federal patent laws. Futhermore, in Compco Corp. v Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,5 9 the Court
indicated that a federal standard would be imposed to determine
what is in the public domain in such cases. If this is so, the
ultimate result would be towards even greater permissiveness in
disclosures of trade secrets that have become part of the public
domain by virtue of a yet unclear federal standard. Unfortunately,
the law is not as precise as it should be and hopefully this discussion has shed some new light on the subject.
55 Id.at 231.
556
7 Id. at 232-33.

See, e.g., Engelhard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324

F.2d 347 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964); Ferroline v. General
Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203
F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
58 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
59 376 U.S. 234 (1964).

